Supreme Court Signals Intent to Overturn 90-Year Precedent Protecting Independent Agency Leaders from Presidential Firing, Expanding Executive Power

Introduction

On December 8, 2025, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter, a case challenging the constitutionality of statutory protections that limit presidential authority to fire leaders of independent federal agencies. The conservative supermajority signaled strong support for overturning Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the 1935 unanimous Supreme Court decision that has constrained presidential removal power for nine decades.

Chief Justice John Roberts characterized the 90-year-old precedent as “a dry husk,” suggesting the Court’s conservative justices view it as outdated and ripe for reversal. In contrast, Justice Elena Kagan warned that eliminating these protections would vest the president with “massive unchecked, uncontrolled power” over vast swaths of the federal regulatory apparatus.

The case arose from President Trump’s March 2025 firing of Federal Trade Commission Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter without citing legal grounds for removal. Federal law permits removal of FTC commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”—protections designed to insulate the agency from political pressure. Trump’s legal team, led by Solicitor General D. John Sauer, argues these statutory restrictions violate Article II of the Constitution’s vesting of executive power in the president.

A ruling in Trump’s favor would represent one of the most significant expansions of presidential power in modern American history, allowing presidents to exert direct political control over agencies that Congress deliberately structured as independent, expert bodies insulated from short-term political pressures. The decision would affect the Federal Reserve Board, Securities and Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Merit Systems Protection Board, and numerous other regulatory entities whose independence has been foundational to their function.

Background of the Case

Trump’s Firing of Rebecca Slaughter

On March 15, 2025, President Trump fired Rebecca Slaughter from her position as a Federal Trade Commission commissioner. Slaughter, who had been serving as acting chair, received notification via letter stating that her continued service “conflicts with the administration’s priorities and policy direction.”

The Federal Trade Commission Act, enacted in 1914, provides that FTC commissioners may be removed by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Trump’s removal letter cited none of these statutory grounds. Instead, it asserted broad presidential authority to remove executive branch officials to ensure accountability and policy coherence.

Slaughter, a Democrat nominated by President Biden, had been leading FTC initiatives on:

• Antitrust enforcement against major technology companies
• Non-compete clause restrictions
• Corporate merger reviews
• Consumer protection against unfair and deceptive practices
• Privacy and data security regulation

Her removal came amid intensified business community pressure on the Trump administration to roll back aggressive antitrust enforcement and regulatory oversight that had characterized the Biden-era FTC.

Legal Challenge and Lower Court Decisions

Slaughter filed suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C., challenging her removal as violating the statutory removal protections and the separation of powers. She argued that Congress has constitutional authority to structure agencies as it deems appropriate, including by limiting presidential removal power to ensure expert, nonpartisan decision-making.

U.S. District Judge Loren AliKhan ruled in Slaughter’s favor, ordering her reinstatement. The court held that Humphrey’s Executor remains binding precedent establishing Congress’s authority to limit presidential removal of multi-member independent agency commissioners to the statutory grounds specified in the enabling legislation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld Judge AliKhan’s decision in a 2-1 ruling. The majority opinion emphasized that for 90 years, Congress and the executive branch had operated under the framework established by Humphrey’s Executor, creating extensive reliance interests. The court found no likelihood the government would succeed in overturning such longstanding, foundational precedent.

Judge Justin Walker dissented, arguing that Humphrey’s Executor conflicts with the Constitution’s text vesting executive power in the president and should be reconsidered.

Supreme Court Review

The Trump administration filed an emergency petition for certiorari and a stay of the lower court injunction. The Supreme Court granted review on an expedited basis and scheduled oral arguments for December 8, 2025—reflecting the case’s significance and the conservative justices’ apparent eagerness to address the removal power question.

The Court directed the parties to brief two specific questions:

1. Whether statutory removal protections for FTC commissioners violate Article II’s separation of powers
2. Whether Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935) should be overruled

The framing of the second question—asking directly whether to overrule the precedent rather than whether it applies in this case—signaled the Court’s openness to fundamentally reconsidering the constitutional foundations of independent agencies.

The Oral Arguments

Government’s Position: Unitary Executive Theory

Solicitor General D. John Sauer argued that Article II of the Constitution vests all executive power in the president, requiring complete presidential control over all officers executing federal law. He contended that Humphrey’s Executor was wrongly decided and contradicts the Constitution’s text and structure.

Core Arguments:

Constitutional Text: Article II, Section 1 states: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Sauer argued this vesting clause grants the president complete authority over executive functions, including the power to remove subordinate officers to ensure accountability and policy coherence.

Accountability: Democratic accountability requires that the people be able to hold the president responsible for the actions of the executive branch. If agency officials cannot be removed, the president cannot be held accountable for their decisions, undermining the constitutional design.

Historical Practice: Sauer pointed to the “Decision of 1789,” in which the First Congress debated presidential removal power and concluded the president possesses inherent constitutional authority to remove executive officers. He characterized Humphrey’s Executor as an aberration from this original understanding.

Precedent Evolution: The government argued that subsequent Supreme Court decisions, particularly Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) and Collins v. Yellen (2021), have undermined Humphrey’s Executor by emphasizing presidential control over executive functions. These more recent cases, the government contends, better reflect constitutional principles and should take precedence.

Practical Problems: Sauer argued that independent agencies create “headless fourth branch” problems—unaccountable bureaucrats exercising significant power without presidential control or direct congressional oversight. He suggested Congress can protect agency independence through other means, such as multi-year terms and staggered appointments.

Slaughter’s Position: Congressional Authority and Settled Practice

Attorney Amit Agarwal of the Protect Democracy Project defended the removal protections, arguing that Humphrey’s Executor correctly interprets the Constitution and that 90 years of reliance on its framework counsel against overruling it.

Core Arguments:

Constitutional Structure: The Constitution grants Congress broad authority to structure executive agencies and prescribe qualifications and procedures for officers. The Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to design agencies appropriate to their functions, including by limiting removal to ensure expert, nonpartisan decision-making.

Functional Considerations: Independent agencies like the FTC exercise quasi-legislative (rulemaking) and quasi-judicial (adjudication) functions in addition to executive responsibilities. These mixed functions justify different structural protections than purely executive officers.

Reliance Interests: For 90 years, Congress has created independent agencies based on Humphrey’s Executor. Federal Reserve independence, SEC market oversight, FTC consumer protection, and numerous other regulatory functions depend on the framework. Overruling the precedent would create massive disruption and uncertainty.

Limited Scope: The removal protections at issue apply only to multi-member independent agencies performing specialized regulatory functions. They do not prevent presidential removal of Cabinet secretaries, U.S. Attorneys, agency enforcement staff, or most executive branch officials. The scope is carefully tailored to contexts where independence serves important governmental functions.

Democratic Safeguards: Congress itself is democratically accountable and made considered judgments that certain agencies function better with protection from political pressure. These legislative choices reflect democratic decision-making and should be respected absent clear constitutional violation.

Precedent Stability: Humphrey’s Executor was a unanimous decision. The Court should not lightly overturn such longstanding, foundational precedent based on evolving theoretical preferences.

Justices’ Questions and Positions

Chief Justice John Roberts expressed deep skepticism about Humphrey’s Executor, calling it “a dry husk” and suggesting it reflected outdated New Deal-era thinking about administrative governance. His characterization signaled strong support for overruling the precedent.

Roberts pressed Slaughter’s counsel on whether there are any meaningful limits to Congress’s authority to insulate officers from removal if Humphrey’s Executor stands. He suggested the precedent creates a slippery slope toward unaccountable bureaucracy.

Justice Clarence Thomas expressed longstanding skepticism of administrative agencies generally and appeared sympathetic to the unitary executive argument. He questioned whether agencies exercising executive power can be insulated from presidential control regardless of their adjudicative or legislative functions.

Justice Samuel Alito focused on accountability concerns, questioning how the president can be held responsible for executive branch actions if officials cannot be removed. He appeared skeptical that staggered terms and bipartisan composition requirements provide sufficient accountability mechanisms.

Justice Neil Gorsuch questioned the distinction between “purely executive” officers and those exercising mixed functions, suggesting the Constitution does not recognize such categories. He emphasized textualist arguments about the vesting of executive power in the president.

Justice Brett Kavanaugh raised concerns about “headless fourth branch” problems and appeared sympathetic to presidential control arguments. However, he also questioned whether the Court should overturn such longstanding precedent and suggested narrower grounds for ruling.

Justice Amy Coney Barrett asked detailed questions about the scope of any potential ruling and its effects on various types of agencies. While she expressed some sympathy for presidential control arguments, her questions suggested possible concern about disrupting settled arrangements.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor vigorously defended Humphrey’s Executor, emphasizing the role of congressional judgment about how best to structure regulatory agencies. She noted that the Federal Reserve’s independence, for example, has been crucial to its credibility and effectiveness in managing monetary policy.

Sotomayor warned that allowing at-will removal would politicize expert decision-making and undermine agencies’ ability to resist short-term political pressure in favor of sound policy based on expertise and evidence.

Justice Elena Kagan delivered the most pointed warning about the implications of overruling Humphrey’s Executor. She stated that eliminating removal protections would give the president “massive unchecked, uncontrolled power” over vast regulatory domains.

Kagan emphasized that independent agencies exist precisely because Congress determined certain functions—managing monetary policy, overseeing securities markets, protecting consumers—require insulation from political pressure to serve their purposes effectively. She questioned whether five justices should undo 90 years of congressional design based on abstract constitutional theory.

Kagan also raised stare decisis concerns, noting that Humphrey’s Executor is not merely any precedent but a foundational decision shaping the entire structure of modern administrative governance. She suggested overruling it would reflect raw ideological preference rather than legal necessity.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson questioned whether the removal power is truly essential to presidential accountability, noting that presidents can influence agency policy through appointments, budget requests, and public persuasion without requiring at-will removal authority.

She also emphasized reliance interests, noting that Congress has repeatedly structured agencies based on Humphrey’s Executor with full understanding of its implications. Disrupting this framework would require extraordinary justification.

Predictions Based on Oral Arguments

Legal observers universally predicted, based on the oral arguments, that the Supreme Court’s conservative majority will vote to overturn Humphrey’s Executor and strike down the removal protections. The likely lineup appears to be 6-3 or possibly 5-4 if Justice Barrett or Kavanaugh ultimately hesitates to take such a consequential step.

The conservative justices’ skepticism of administrative agencies generally, commitment to unitary executive theory, and apparent view that Humphrey’s Executor represents outdated thinking all point toward a decision expanding presidential removal power.

The primary uncertainty is whether the Court will:

• Issue a sweeping decision overruling Humphrey’s Executor entirely and invalidating all removal protections for independent agency heads
• Craft a narrower ruling distinguishing FTC commissioners from other agency officials or finding removal protections invalid in particular contexts
• Attempt to preserve some independent agencies (like the Federal Reserve) while invalidating protections for others

Legal and Constitutional Framework

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935)

The precedent at stake was decided in 1935 in a unanimous opinion by Justice George Sutherland, a conservative jurist appointed by President Warren G. Harding.

Facts: President Franklin D. Roosevelt fired Federal Trade Commissioner William Humphrey, seeking to replace him with someone aligned with New Deal policies. The FTC Act permitted removal only for statutory causes. Humphrey’s estate sued for back pay.

Holding: The Supreme Court ruled that Congress may limit presidential removal of officials serving in agencies exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. The Court distinguished such officials from purely executive officers subject to at-will removal.

Reasoning: The Court emphasized that the FTC was designed by Congress as an independent body exercising expert judgment insulated from political pressure. This congressional design choice was permissible because:

• The FTC’s functions are not purely executive but include rulemaking and adjudication
• The agency’s effectiveness depends on independence and expertise
• Article II’s vesting of executive power does not automatically require at-will removal of all officers
• Congress has constitutional authority to structure agencies as appropriate to their functions

Significance: Humphrey’s Executor became the foundational precedent justifying independent agencies. For 90 years, it has been understood as settling that Congress may limit removal of officials serving on multi-member independent agencies performing specialized regulatory functions.

Myers v. United States (1926)

Nine years before Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court decided Myers v. United States, which reached a very different conclusion about presidential removal power.

Facts: President Woodrow Wilson removed a postmaster before the end of his term without Senate consent, violating a statute requiring Senate approval for removal.

Holding: The Court struck down the statutory restriction, holding that the president has constitutional authority to remove executive officers without congressional limitation.

Reasoning: Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s majority opinion emphasized:

• Article II vests executive power in the president
• Effective presidential control requires removal authority
• The Decision of 1789 established original understanding of presidential removal power
• Congressional restrictions impermissibly intrude on executive functions

Relationship to Humphrey’s Executor: The Court in Humphrey’s Executor distinguished Myers by emphasizing that postmasters perform purely executive functions, while FTC commissioners exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial roles. This functional distinction has been central to independent agency jurisprudence ever since.

Recent Supreme Court Decisions

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020): The Supreme Court struck down the removal protection for the CFPB director—a single director who could be removed only for cause. The 5-4 decision emphasized that vesting substantial executive power in a single individual insulated from removal creates excessive insulation from accountability.

Critically, the majority opinion distinguished Humphrey’s Executor rather than overruling it, suggesting multi-member independent agencies with bipartisan composition differ from single-director structures.

Collins v. Yellen (2021): The Court invalidated the removal protection for the single director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency on similar grounds.

Both decisions left Humphrey’s Executor formally intact while casting doubt on its vitality. They emphasized presidential control and accountability in ways that appeared to narrow the circumstances in which removal protections survive constitutional scrutiny.

Constitutional Arguments

Unitary Executive Theory: This theory holds that Article II’s vesting clause—“The executive Power shall be vested in a President”—grants complete presidential control over all executive functions. Proponents argue:

• The president must be able to remove subordinates to ensure accountability and policy coherence
• Allowing Congress to insulate officers from removal creates an unconstitutional “headless fourth branch”
• The Decision of 1789 established original understanding supporting presidential removal power
• Democratic accountability requires the people be able to hold the president responsible for executive action

Congressional Power to Structure Agencies: Critics of unitary executive theory emphasize:

• The Constitution grants Congress authority to structure agencies through the Necessary and Proper Clause
• Article II itself contemplates congressional involvement in structuring executive offices
• The Framers did not clearly resolve removal power questions, and early practice was contested
• Functional considerations support tailoring removal protections to different types of agencies and functions

Affected Agencies and Functions

Federal Reserve System

The Federal Reserve Board of Governors consists of seven members appointed to 14-year staggered terms, removable only for cause. Fed independence has been considered essential to:

• Insulating monetary policy from short-term political pressures
• Maintaining credibility with financial markets
• Making decisions based on economic expertise rather than electoral considerations
• Preventing political manipulation of interest rates and money supply

If removal protections are eliminated, presidents could fire Fed governors who resist politically popular but economically unsound monetary policies—such as keeping interest rates artificially low before elections regardless of inflationary consequences.

Financial markets depend on Fed independence for predictability and credibility. Eliminating removal protections could undermine this confidence and create market instability.

Securities and Exchange Commission

The SEC consists of five commissioners appointed to staggered five-year terms, with no more than three from any political party, removable only for cause. The SEC oversees:

• Securities markets and exchanges
• Corporate disclosure and financial reporting
• Broker-dealer regulation
• Investment adviser and investment company oversight
• Enforcement against securities fraud and market manipulation

SEC independence has been considered crucial to resisting political pressure to overlook corporate misconduct or relax enforcement during economic downturns. Allowing political control could undermine market integrity and investor confidence.

Federal Trade Commission

The FTC consists of five commissioners appointed to seven-year staggered terms, with no more than three from any political party, removable only for cause. The FTC’s responsibilities include:

• Antitrust enforcement
• Consumer protection against unfair and deceptive practices
• Privacy and data security regulation
• Review of corporate mergers
• Competition policy development

FTC independence allows commissioners to resist business and political pressure to approve anticompetitive mergers or tolerate consumer protection violations. Politicization could lead to enforcement decisions driven by presidential preferences rather than legal and economic analysis.

National Labor Relations Board

The NLRB consists of five board members appointed to staggered five-year terms, removable only for cause. The NLRB:

• Adjudicates unfair labor practice charges
• Conducts union representation elections
• Interprets and enforces federal labor law
• Resolves disputes between employers and unions

NLRB independence allows it to apply labor law based on statutory interpretation and precedent rather than shifting political winds. Removing this independence could lead to wildly oscillating labor law enforcement depending on which party controls the presidency.

Other Affected Agencies

Numerous other independent agencies face potential impacts:

• Consumer Product Safety Commission - product safety standards and recalls
• Federal Communications Commission - telecommunications and media regulation
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission - energy markets and infrastructure
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission - nuclear facility safety
• Merit Systems Protection Board - federal employee appeals
• Federal Election Commission - campaign finance enforcement
• Commodity Futures Trading Commission - derivatives markets
• National Transportation Safety Board - transportation accident investigation
• Federal Maritime Commission - maritime commerce regulation
• Postal Regulatory Commission - postal service oversight

Each was structured with removal protections based on congressional judgment that independence would improve decision-making in technical, specialized domains requiring expertise and insulation from political pressure.

Implications and Consequences

Concentration of Presidential Power

Eliminating removal protections would represent one of the most significant expansions of presidential power in modern American history.

Presidents would gain ability to:

• Replace agency leaders who resist politically preferred outcomes
• Exert direct control over regulatory enforcement and policy
• Respond to political pressure from constituents and interest groups by firing “problematic” agency officials
• Align all executive branch decision-making with presidential priorities

This concentration of authority in a single elected official represents a fundamental shift in American governance from a system of checks, balances, and specialized expertise toward a more hierarchical, executive-dominated model.

Politicization of Expert Decision-Making

Independent agencies were designed to make technical decisions based on expertise, evidence, and statutory mandates rather than political considerations.

Examples of decisions that could be politicized:

• Federal Reserve interest rate decisions timed to influence elections
• SEC enforcement actions dropped against companies with political connections
• FTC approval of anticompetitive mergers favoring presidential allies
• NLRB rulings systematically favoring employers or unions based on presidential preferences
• Nuclear Regulatory Commission safety decisions influenced by political pressure

The shift from expert, evidence-based decision-making to politically responsive judgment could undermine the quality of regulatory outcomes and public confidence in agency integrity.

Market and Economic Effects

Financial markets and regulated industries depend on regulatory predictability and credibility.

Federal Reserve: Loss of monetary policy independence could:

• Reduce Fed credibility, potentially increasing inflation expectations
• Create market uncertainty about political interference in interest rate decisions
• Undermine dollar confidence and international monetary system stability
• Lead to politically motivated boom-bust cycles

SEC and Financial Regulation: Politicization could:

• Reduce investor confidence in market integrity
• Create regulatory uncertainty about enforcement priorities
• Undermine corporate governance and financial disclosure
• Increase systemic financial risk

FTC and Antitrust: Political control could:

• Lead to merger approvals based on political considerations rather than competitive effects
• Create regulatory uncertainty for businesses
• Undermine consumer protection enforcement

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

The elimination of removal protections concentrates power in the presidency at the expense of congressional authority to structure agencies and institutional checks on executive authority.

Congress deliberately created independent agencies with removal protections based on judgments about how best to accomplish statutory objectives. The Supreme Court invalidating these structures effectively overrides legislative choices about agency design and limits Congress’s ability to ensure effective governance in technical, specialized domains.

This represents a shift in the constitutional balance of power from shared authority toward executive dominance—ironically through judicial action that purports to enforce separation of powers.

Comparison to Other Democracies

Most established democracies maintain independent regulatory agencies insulated from direct political control:

• Central banks worldwide are generally structured to ensure monetary policy independence
• Securities regulators, competition authorities, and other technical agencies typically have structural protections
• International best practices emphasize independence for effective regulation

The United States would become an outlier among advanced democracies by eliminating such protections and concentrating regulatory authority in political leadership subject to electoral pressures and short-term considerations.

Precedent for Further Expansion of Executive Power

A sweeping decision overruling Humphrey’s Executor could open the door to additional expansions of presidential authority.

If the unitary executive theory prevails comprehensively, it could support:

• Presidential control over independent counsels or inspectors general
• Elimination of civil service protections for federal employees
• Presidential override of agency expertise and technical judgments
• Reduced judicial deference to agency interpretations of law
• Broader challenges to congressional limits on executive authority

Historical and Political Context

The New Deal and Administrative State

Humphrey’s Executor emerged from conflicts between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and independent agencies resisting New Deal policies. FDR sought to replace commissioners with officials aligned with his agenda, leading to the constitutional confrontation.

The unanimous 1935 decision rejecting FDR’s position reflected consensus—even among conservative justices skeptical of the New Deal—that Congress had authority to structure agencies with removal protections when performing quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.

For 90 years, this framework has been foundational to American administrative governance, with Congress creating dozens of independent agencies based on the Humphrey’s Executor model.

Conservative Legal Movement and Deregulation

The push to overturn Humphrey’s Executor reflects broader conservative legal movement priorities:

• Constraining the administrative state and regulatory authority
• Expanding presidential power at the expense of congressional and agency authority
• Advancing unitary executive theory
• Reducing agency independence and expertise-driven decision-making
• Promoting deregulation and business interests

The Federalist Society, conservative legal networks, and business groups have promoted unitary executive theory and challenges to independent agencies for decades. The current Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority creates the opportunity to implement this long-term agenda.

Trump’s Attacks on Independent Agencies

President Trump has systematically attacked independent agencies that resist his directives:

• Federal Reserve: Repeatedly demanded interest rate cuts and attacked Chair Jerome Powell
• FTC: Fired Rebecca Slaughter for pursuing aggressive antitrust enforcement
• NLRB: Fired board members pursuing worker-friendly interpretations of labor law
• Federal Communications Commission: Pressured agency on media regulations
• Securities and Exchange Commission: Sought to influence enforcement decisions

The Trump v. Slaughter case arose directly from this broader pattern of asserting presidential control over agencies that Congress designed to exercise independent judgment.

Broader Constitutional Implications

Administrative Law and Regulatory State

A ruling eliminating removal protections would be part of a broader conservative judicial project to constrain the administrative state:

• West Virginia v. EPA (2022) - limiting agency authority through “major questions doctrine”
• Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024) - overruling Chevron deference to agency interpretations
• Numerous cases limiting agency enforcement authority and rulemaking discretion
• Challenges to agency adjudication systems

Collectively, these developments represent a fundamental reordering of American governance, reducing agency autonomy, expertise-driven decision-making, and congressional ability to delegate authority to specialized bodies.

Executive Power More Broadly

The unitary executive theory advanced in Trump v. Slaughter has implications beyond independent agencies:

• Presidential control over federal prosecutions
• Elimination of special counsel and inspector general independence
• Reduced civil service protections
• Broader presidential authority to override agency expertise

If the theory prevails in its strongest form, it could support consolidation of executive power across numerous domains currently subject to statutory restrictions or institutional constraints.

Judicial Philosophy and Precedent

The Court’s willingness to overturn Humphrey’s Executor—a unanimous 90-year-old precedent on which Congress has repeatedly relied—raises fundamental questions about judicial restraint and the role of precedent (stare decisis).

If such longstanding, foundational precedents are subject to reversal based on evolving theoretical preferences, the stability and predictability of constitutional law comes into question. This is particularly concerning when the reversal serves ideological goals of the current judicial majority.

Conclusion

The December 8, 2025 oral arguments in Trump v. Slaughter revealed a Supreme Court poised to fundamentally transform the structure of American governance by overturning nine decades of precedent protecting independent agency leaders from at-will presidential removal.

Chief Justice Roberts’s characterization of Humphrey’s Executor as “a dry husk” and the conservative majority’s evident skepticism suggest the Court will rule in President Trump’s favor, allowing presidents to fire agency leaders without statutory cause. Justice Kagan’s warning that this would create “massive unchecked, uncontrolled power” captures the stakes: a historic expansion of presidential authority at the expense of congressional design choices, agency expertise, and institutional checks on political control.

The implications extend far beyond the Federal Trade Commission to encompass the Federal Reserve, SEC, NLRB, and numerous other agencies whose independence has been foundational to effective governance in technical, specialized domains requiring expertise and insulation from short-term political pressure.

Whether this represents a restoration of constitutional original meaning (as the conservative majority argues) or an ideologically-driven power grab undermining institutional constraints on executive authority (as critics contend) will be debated for generations. What is certain is that the anticipated decision will mark one of the most consequential expansions of presidential power in American history, fundamentally altering the balance between political control and independent expertise in regulatory governance.

The oral arguments of December 8, 2025 may well be remembered as the moment when the Supreme Court’s conservative supermajority signaled its intent to dismantle the modern administrative state’s structural protections against unchecked presidential power—beginning with the elimination of independent agencies’ ability to resist political interference in expert decision-making.

Sources

• SCOTUSblog. “Trump v. Slaughter: an explainer.” December 2025. https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/12/trump-v-slaughter-an-explainer/

• K&L Gates. “Supreme Court to Redefine the President’s Power to Fire Independent Agency Heads: Implications for Business.” November 25, 2025. https://www.klgates.com/Supreme-Court-to-Redefine-the-Presidents-Power-to-Fire-Independent-Agency-Heads-Implications-for-Business-11-25-2025

• The Columbian. “Supreme Court seems likely to back Trump’s power to fire independent agency board members.” December 8, 2025. https://www.columbian.com/news/2025/dec/08/supreme-court-seems-likely-to-back-trumps-power-to-fire-independent-agency-board-members/

• Fortune. “Supreme Court to reconsider a 90-year-old unanimous ruling that limits presidential power on removing heads of independent agencies.” December 7, 2025. https://fortune.com/2025/12/07/supreme-court-humphreys-executor-unanimous-ruling-presidential-power-limit-heads-independent-agencies/

• Las Vegas Sun. “Supreme Court seems likely to back Trump’s power to fire independent agency board members.” December 7, 2025. https://lasvegassun.com/news/2025/dec/07/supreme-court-seems-likely-to-back-trumps-power-to/

• Center for American Progress. “What Is Humphrey’s Executor and Why Should You Care About It?” https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-is-humphreys-executor-and-why-should-you-care-about-it/