DOJ Sues Google Over Ad Tech Monopoly, Seeks Historic Breakup

On January 24, 2023, the United States Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Google seeking to break up the company’s advertising technology business—marking the first government attempt to structurally dismantle a major corporation since AT&T in 1982. The case represents a fundamental shift in antitrust enforcement toward structural remedies for platform monopolies.

The Charges

The DOJ’s complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and joined by eight state Attorneys General (California, Colorado, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia), alleges Google violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by:

1. Illegally monopolizing three separate markets:

   • Publisher ad server market (at least 90% market share)
   • Ad exchange market (more than 50% market share)
   • Advertiser ad network market (dominant position)

2. Maintaining monopolies through:

   • Anticompetitive acquisitions (DoubleClick)
   • Exclusionary conduct foreclosing competitors
   • Manipulation of auction mechanics
   • Systematic conflicts of interest from vertical integration

The Case for Breakup

Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter stated: “Today’s complaint alleges that Google has used anticompetitive, exclusionary, and unlawful conduct to eliminate or severely diminish any threat to its dominance over digital advertising technologies.”

The complaint documented fifteen years of systematic monopolization:

Phase 1: Acquiring Monopoly (2008)

DoubleClick acquisition: Google paid $3.1 billion to acquire dominant publisher ad server and ad exchange, creating vertical integration across ad tech stack despite concerns that the merger would harm competition.

Phase 2: Foreclosing Competition (2009-2020)

Acquisition spree: Google acquired AdMeld (2011) and other competitors to consolidate control

Exclusive dealing: Contracts preventing publishers from using competing ad servers

Product tying: Requiring use of Google Ad Manager to access Google’s ad exchange

Technical manipulation: Making competing ad tech incompatible or less effective

Phase 3: Systematic Exploitation (2013-present)

Project Bernanke: Manipulated second-price auctions using insider information to advantage Google’s own ad-buying platform while reducing publisher revenues by up to 40%

Jedi Blue: Colluded with Facebook to eliminate header bidding competition that threatened Google’s monopoly

Monopoly pricing: Extracted 30-50% of advertising dollars vs. 10-15% for competitive intermediaries

The Structural Remedy: Forced Divestiture

The DOJ’s complaint requests “structural relief”—the divestiture of at minimum:

1. Google Ad Manager (formerly DoubleClick for Publishers)
2. Google AdX (formerly DoubleClick Ad Exchange)
3. Any additional structural relief as needed

Why Divestiture?

The DOJ argued that behavioral remedies would be insufficient because:

Conflicts of interest are inherent: Controlling publisher ad servers, ad exchanges, and advertiser tools creates unavoidable conflicts where Google profits from exploiting both sides

Monitoring is impractical: Google’s technical complexity makes behavioral oversight impossible to enforce effectively

Incentives remain: Without structural separation, Google retains motivation and ability to manipulate markets

Past failures: Behavioral remedies in prior tech antitrust cases (Microsoft consent decree) failed to restore effective competition

Associate Attorney General Vanita Gupta stated: “Having inserted itself into all aspects of the digital advertising marketplace, Google has used anticompetitive, exclusionary, and unlawful means to eliminate or severely diminish any threat to its dominance.”

Market Dominance Documentation

The complaint presented extensive evidence of Google’s monopoly power:

Publisher Ad Server Market

• Google’s share: At least 90%
• Revenue: Over $20 billion annually
• Control: Publishers have no viable alternatives

Ad Exchange Market

• Google’s share: More than 50%
• Transactions: Billions of ad impressions daily
• Manipulation: Project Bernanke and auction rigging documented

Advertiser Ad Network Market

• Google’s dominance: Largest by far
• Lock-in effects: Advertisers must use Google Ads to reach publishers
• Integration advantage: Combined with YouTube and search creates must-buy platform

The Monopoly Tax

“Google pockets on average more than 30% of advertising dollars that flow through its digital advertising technology products. For some transactions and certain publishers and advertisers, it takes far more."—DOJ Complaint

This 30-50% take-rate compares to 10-15% for competitive ad intermediaries, representing monopoly extraction of $10-15 billion annually.

Evidence of Anticompetitive Conduct

The complaint detailed systematic monopolization:

Neutralizing Competitors Through Acquisition

“Google’s plan has been simple but effective: (1) neutralize or eliminate ad tech competitors, actual or potential, through a series of acquisitions; and (2) wield its dominance across digital advertising markets to force more publishers and advertisers to use its products.”

Key acquisitions cited:

• DoubleClick (2008): $3.1 billion
• AdMeld (2011): $400 million
• Invite Media: Acquired to prevent competitive ad buying
• Numerous smaller competitors eliminated through acquisition

Foreclosing Competition Through Vertical Integration

Google used control of one market layer to foreclose competition in adjacent layers:

• Publishers using Google Ad Manager faced pressure to use Google’s exchange
• Advertisers using Google Ads received advantages on Google’s exchange
• Competing exchanges couldn’t access publishers using Google’s ad server
• Competing ad servers couldn’t match Google’s exchange demand

Manipulation of Auction Mechanics

The complaint documented:

• Project Bernanke’s second-price auction manipulation
• Last look advantages where Google saw competitor bids before deciding
• Preferential treatment for Google’s own platforms
• Opacity preventing publishers and advertisers from detecting manipulation

Coordination to Eliminate Competition

• Jedi Blue agreement with Facebook to kill header bidding
• Efforts to characterize header bidding as fraudulent
• Unified pricing rules designed to make competing exchanges less effective

Legal Framework

The case relies on two antitrust theories:

Section 1 (Contracts in Restraint of Trade)

Google’s agreements with publishers, advertisers, and other platforms (like Facebook in Jedi Blue) constitute unreasonable restraints of trade that harm competition.

Section 2 (Monopolization)

Google has:

1. Monopoly power in three markets (proven by market share over 50%)
2. Willfully acquired or maintained that power through anticompetitive conduct
3. Harmed competition through foreclosure, manipulation, and extraction

Historical Context: First Breakup Since AT&T

The DOJ’s divestiture request is extraordinary:

Last successful breakup: AT&T (1982), which created seven “Baby Bells” and revolutionized telecommunications

Last attempted breakup: Microsoft (2000), proposed but settled with behavioral remedies

Significance: DOJ hasn’t sought to break up a company in over 40 years, indicating the severity of Google’s monopoly and failure of behavioral remedies in tech markets

Google’s Defense

Google characterized the lawsuit as “a doubling down on a flawed argument,” arguing:

1. Competitive market: Publishers and advertisers have numerous alternatives
2. Pro-consumer: Google’s ad tech improves efficiency and targeting
3. Integration benefits: Vertical integration creates better products
4. Cherry-picked evidence: DOJ mischaracterizes normal business practices

Google’s Vice President Dan Taylor stated: “DOJ is doubling down on a flawed argument that would slow innovation, raise advertising fees, and make it harder for thousands of small businesses and publishers to grow.”

Publisher and Advertiser Support for DOJ

Unlike Google’s claims, numerous publishers and advertisers supported the DOJ’s action:

News Media Alliance (representing 2,000+ publishers): “Google has monopoly power in the ad tech market and has used that power to hurt publishers and advertisers, while keeping massive profits for itself.”

Individual publishers testified about:

• Declining revenues despite increased traffic
• Inability to switch to competing ad tech
• Lack of transparency in Google’s pricing
• Economic harm to journalism from monopoly extraction

Trial and Timeline

The case was assigned to Judge Leonie Brinkema in the Eastern District of Virginia, known for efficiency and tech expertise.

Key dates:

• January 24, 2023: Complaint filed
• September 9, 2024: Trial begins
• September 27, 2024: Trial concludes
• November 25, 2024: Closing arguments
• Expected 2025: Ruling on liability
• If DOJ wins: Remedies phase to determine scope of divestiture

Significance for Tech Antitrust

The Google ad tech case represents multiple antitrust watersheds:

Structural Remedies Return

After decades of relying on behavioral remedies (conduct restrictions), the DOJ is seeking structural relief (forced divestiture). This acknowledges that:

• Platform markets require stronger intervention
• Behavioral remedies are difficult to monitor and enforce
• Conflicts of interest from vertical integration can’t be managed through conduct restrictions
• Some monopolies require breaking up, not just constraining

Vertical Integration Scrutiny

The case establishes that vertical integration of platform infrastructure can be anticompetitive when it:

• Creates conflicts of interest
• Enables systematic self-preferencing
• Forecloses competition at multiple market levels
• Allows manipulation through information advantages

Platform Accountability

By seeking to break up Google’s ad tech business, the DOJ signals that no tech platform is too large or important to face structural remedies. This influenced:

• FTC’s case seeking to break up Facebook
• Congressional proposals for platform regulation
• EU’s Digital Markets Act structural provisions
• Recognition that platform power requires aggressive antitrust enforcement

Broader Implications

The ad tech case is part of coordinated assault on Google’s monopoly power:

1. Search case (filed October 2020): Ruled Google illegal monopolist August 2024
2. Ad tech case (filed January 2023): Trial completed September 2024
3. State cases: Multiple states filed parallel suits
4. EU cases: Over €8 billion in fines for monopoly abuse

Together, these cases document Google’s systematic monopolization across search, mobile, and advertising—representing perhaps the most comprehensive antitrust enforcement against a single company in modern history.

Economic Stakes

Breaking up Google’s ad tech business would:

For publishers:

• Increase competition for ad inventory
• Raise advertising revenues potentially 20-40%
• Restore bargaining power against tech platforms
• Provide funding to support journalism

For advertisers:

• Lower fees from reduced monopoly pricing
• Increase transparency in ad spending
• Enable effective use of competing platforms
• Improve ROI on digital advertising

For competition:

• Allow ad tech competitors to effectively compete
• Enable innovation in advertising technology
• Restore competitive market structure
• Prevent future monopolization through vertical integration

The Stakes for Antitrust Enforcement

If the DOJ succeeds in breaking up Google’s ad tech business, it would:

1. Prove structural remedies are viable for platform monopolies
2. Establish precedent for breaking up vertically-integrated tech giants
3. Demonstrate political will to challenge most powerful corporations
4. Reinvigorate antitrust enforcement after decades of permissive policy
5. Signal to other platforms that monopoly abuse faces meaningful consequences

If Google defeats the case, it would suggest that tech platforms have effectively become too powerful to face structural accountability—a troubling conclusion for democratic governance of economic power.

The Google ad tech case thus represents a pivotal moment: either antitrust law proves capable of addressing platform monopolies through structural relief, or it becomes clear that new legislation is necessary to restore competitive markets in the digital economy.