FCC bans Huawei and ZTE as national security threats while Carbyne operates unchecked

The Federal Communications Commission voted unanimously to ban imports and sales of telecommunications equipment from Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE, citing “unacceptable risk” to national security and critical infrastructure. FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel stated the agency was “protecting our national security by ensuring that untrustworthy communications equipment is not authorized for use within our borders.” The ban, implemented under the Secure Equipment Act, represented the first time in FCC history that equipment authorizations were prohibited based on national security concerns.

Congress had previously allocated $1.9 billion for a “rip and replace” reimbursement program to remove existing Huawei and ZTE equipment from U.S. telecommunications networks. However, the FCC reported the program was underfunded by over $3 billion, with at least 24,000 pieces of equipment spanning approximately 8,400 locations requiring replacement. The stated concerns centered on Chinese government influence, surveillance capability in telecommunications infrastructure, data collection risks, technology sovereignty, and potential intelligence access.

The same month the ban took effect, Carbyne—a 911 call-handling platform founded by veterans of Israeli military intelligence Unit 8200—was operational in multiple U.S. states processing emergency communications. Carbyne’s executive team included former Unit 8200 members: CEO Amir Elichai, co-founder Lital Leshem (who also worked for Israeli private intelligence firm Black Cube), and company director Pinchas Berkus, a former Brigadier General of the elite signals intelligence unit. By November 2022, Carbyne had deployed systems in Texas, California, Nevada, Georgia, and other states through partnerships with local governments and emergency services.

Despite Carbyne’s comparable surveillance capabilities—including real-time video streaming, location tracking, and comprehensive emergency call data collection—and its documented origins in foreign military intelligence operations, there was no evidence of federal security review by DHS, CISA, or other agencies. The regulatory double standard revealed a systematic blind spot: Chinese telecommunications companies faced comprehensive bans and multi-billion-dollar removal programs based on national security concerns about foreign government influence and surveillance potential, while an Israeli intelligence-founded company with similar capabilities and foreign military intelligence personnel received state and local government contracts without documented federal scrutiny.

The contrast was particularly stark given that both scenarios involved foreign-developed technology with potential intelligence access to sensitive U.S. communications infrastructure. Carbyne’s systems processed millions of emergency calls containing highly sensitive personal data, real-time location information, and video feeds—arguably more immediately valuable intelligence than telecommunications equipment data. Yet the company operated without the coordinated intelligence community assessment (NSA, FBI, CIA, Five Eyes) that informed the Huawei/ZTE ban, and without congressional appropriations for security reviews or alternative systems.