Six Amazon Workers Killed in Edwardsville Warehouse Tornado Collapse

On December 10, 2021, an EF-3 tornado struck Amazon’s DLI4 delivery facility in Edwardsville, Illinois, causing catastrophic structural damage that killed six workers: Deandre S. Morrow (28), Kevin D. Dickey (62), Clayton Lynn Cope (29), Etheria S. Hebb (24), Larry E. Virden (46), and Austin J. McEwen (26). The deaths occurred during the peak holiday shopping season as Amazon maintained operations despite tornado warnings, with workers taking shelter in a bathroom on the south side of the building—the exact location where the tornado struck and collapsed the wall. The tragedy raised urgent questions about Amazon’s emergency preparedness, its cellphone ban policy that prevented workers from receiving emergency alerts, and its prioritization of delivery schedules over worker safety during severe weather.

The Tornado Strike and Building Collapse

On the evening of December 10, 2021, a powerful EF-3 tornado bore down on the Amazon DLI4 delivery facility in Edwardsville, Illinois, part of the Greater St. Louis region. The facility had received tornado warnings, but operations continued until the tornado was imminent. When workers were finally directed to take shelter, confusion about the proper shelter location led approximately 10 employees to seek refuge in a bathroom on the southern side of the building.

The tornado struck the southern side of the facility—precisely where the workers had sheltered. The west-facing wall collapsed onto the bathroom, killing six workers and critically injuring one. The victims represented a cross-section of Amazon’s workforce: young and older, Black and white, employees and delivery drivers, ranging from 24 to 62 years old. All died while working for one of the world’s most profitable companies during its most lucrative season.

The Victims

Deandre S. Morrow, 28, of St. Louis, Missouri Kevin D. Dickey, 62, of Carlyle, Illinois Clayton Lynn Cope, 29, of Alton, Illinois Etheria S. Hebb, 24, of St. Louis, Missouri Larry E. Virden, 46, of Collinsville, Illinois Austin J. McEwen, 26, Amazon cargo driver

Each victim had families, communities, and futures that were extinguished because they were working at an Amazon warehouse during a tornado. Several were young workers in their twenties, just beginning their adult lives. Others were experienced workers in middle age, likely supporting families. All died preventably, in a disaster that highlighted multiple failures of Amazon’s safety systems and priorities.

Emergency Preparedness Failures

The Edwardsville tornado deaths exposed critical failures in Amazon’s emergency preparedness:

Confused Shelter Protocols: The fact that 10 workers took shelter in a bathroom on the southern side—the exact location the tornado struck—suggested either inadequate training about proper shelter locations or inadequate shelter infrastructure. In tornado-prone regions, proper shelter locations should be clearly marked, regularly drilled, and located in the safest areas of buildings (typically interior rooms away from exterior walls).

Inadequate Warning Time: Workers reported having minimal time between tornado warnings and the actual strike to reach shelter. This raised questions about whether Amazon delayed evacuation or shelter-in-place orders to maintain operations, prioritizing package processing over worker safety.

Building Structural Vulnerabilities: The catastrophic collapse of the wall onto the bathroom where workers sheltered suggested the facility wasn’t built to withstand EF-3 tornado-force winds, despite being located in a region with regular tornado activity. Proper tornado shelters should be reinforced areas capable of withstanding extreme winds and debris.

Lack of Storm Shelters: Unlike some warehouses in tornado-prone regions that include reinforced safe rooms or underground shelters, the Amazon facility apparently relied on bathrooms and interior spaces that proved inadequate against a major tornado.

The Cellphone Ban Controversy

A particularly contentious issue emerged around Amazon’s cellphone ban policy for warehouse workers. For years, Amazon had prohibited workers from carrying personal cellphones on the warehouse floor, requiring them to leave phones in lockers. The company cited productivity, security, and safety concerns (distraction risks).

However, during the pandemic, Amazon had relaxed the cellphone ban to allow workers to coordinate childcare and stay in touch with families during COVID-related disruptions. In late 2021, Amazon had announced plans to reinstate the cellphone ban effective January 1, 2022—just weeks after the Edwardsville tornado.

The cellphone issue became critical because:

Emergency Alerts: Workers with cellphones could have received direct tornado warnings and emergency alerts from weather services and local authorities, potentially providing crucial additional warning time or information beyond what Amazon management provided.

Communication with Families: Several workers had kept their cellphones despite the policy, violating Amazon rules. In the aftermath, these workers’ families were able to receive final text messages or calls. Workers without phones had no ability to communicate with loved ones during the emergency.

Worker Agency: The cellphone ban symbolized Amazon’s control over worker information and communication. Workers couldn’t independently assess danger or make informed decisions about their safety—they had to rely entirely on management’s judgment about when conditions warranted evacuation or shelter.

Retaliation Fears: The fact that some workers violated the cellphone ban to maintain emergency communication highlighted how Amazon policies created tensions between worker safety and company rules, with workers potentially facing discipline for protecting themselves.

After the tornado deaths, Amazon faced intense criticism for the cellphone ban. Workers and labor advocates argued that Amazon’s productivity and control priorities had created a policy that left workers vulnerable during emergencies. The company subsequently acknowledged that workers were allowed to have cellphones, but workers disputed this characterization, noting the policy had been enforced until pandemic-related relaxation.

Continued Operations During Warnings

The Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) and worker advocates criticized Amazon for requiring employees to work through tornado warnings. Weather alerts for severe tornadic activity were issued hours before the tornado struck, yet the facility remained operational until the tornado was imminent.

This pattern—maintaining operations during dangerous weather to meet delivery schedules—reflected Amazon’s broader prioritization of productivity over worker safety. The tornado struck during the peak holiday shopping season, when Amazon was processing massive order volumes and facing intense pressure to maintain delivery promises. Workers reported that productivity quotas and operational schedules were rarely adjusted for weather conditions, creating pressure to continue working despite potential danger.

The decision to keep the facility operational until the tornado was nearly upon it meant workers were in the warehouse when they could have been evacuated or sent home earlier when the severe weather threat became apparent. This calculated risk—betting that severe weather wouldn’t actually materialize or wouldn’t strike the specific facility—proved catastrophic.

OSHA Investigation and Findings

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) launched an investigation into the warehouse collapse immediately after the deaths. The investigation examined:

• Emergency preparedness and evacuation protocols
• Building structural integrity and tornado shelter adequacy
• Warning systems and communication with workers
• Training provided to workers about severe weather responses
• Management decision-making about continuing operations during warnings

However, like many OSHA investigations of workplace deaths, the process moved slowly, and meaningful accountability proved elusive. Amazon’s vast legal resources and the complexities of attributing the deaths to specific regulatory violations versus “act of God” made securing significant penalties difficult.

Political Response and Safety Concerns

Senators Elizabeth Warren, Cory Booker, and Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez questioned Amazon’s decision to rebuild the warehouse without implementing key safety improvements. In a letter to Amazon, they demanded information about:

• What safety improvements would be implemented at the rebuilt facility
• Whether Amazon was retrofitting other facilities in tornado-prone regions
• What changes to emergency preparedness protocols were being made
• How Amazon would ensure worker safety during future severe weather events

The lawmakers noted that Amazon had the financial resources to build state-of-the-art storm shelters and implement best-in-class emergency warning systems, but appeared to prioritize cost savings and operational efficiency over comprehensive worker protection.

Significance: The Deadly Cost of Productivity Obsession

The Edwardsville tornado deaths crystallized the fatal consequences of Amazon’s productivity-above-all corporate culture. Six workers died not because a tornado was unavoidable, but because multiple preventable failures converged:

Inadequate Shelter Infrastructure: Amazon could have built reinforced tornado shelters but apparently relied on bathrooms and interior spaces.

Cellphone Restrictions: Company policies prevented workers from receiving independent weather alerts and communicating with families during emergencies.

Operational Pressures: The imperative to maintain delivery schedules during peak season created pressure to continue operations during severe weather warnings.

Unclear Protocols: Workers didn’t know where to shelter or received inadequate warning time, suggesting training and emergency communication failures.

Building Vulnerabilities: The facility’s construction apparently couldn’t withstand EF-3 tornado forces, despite being in a tornado-prone region.

The deaths occurred at a facility designed to facilitate rapid delivery of consumer goods—packages that were utterly trivial compared to the six lives lost. The image of workers dying while sheltering in a bathroom as a tornado collapsed the warehouse wall onto them became a symbol of how Amazon’s celebrated efficiency and two-day delivery were built on a foundation of worker exploitation that could prove fatal.

The tornado deaths also highlighted geographic patterns of Amazon’s labor exploitation. The company often located warehouses in regions with lower wages, weaker unions, and less stringent regulations—including tornado-prone areas of the Midwest and South. This geographic arbitrage meant workers in these regions faced compounded vulnerabilities: lower wages, weaker worker protections, and exposure to severe weather risks that Amazon’s safety infrastructure proved inadequate to address.

For families of the victims, the tornado deaths represented not just personal tragedies but accountability failures. Their loved ones died working for one of the world’s most profitable companies, owned by one of the world’s richest people, yet Amazon’s safety systems failed to protect them from a foreseeable weather threat in a region where tornadoes are common and predictable.

The Edwardsville tornado became a rallying point for advocates demanding comprehensive reforms to Amazon’s worker safety practices, regulatory enforcement of workplace safety standards, and accountability for corporate decisions that prioritized operational continuity over worker welfare. The six deaths demonstrated that Amazon’s exploitation of workers wasn’t just about low wages, grueling quotas, or union suppression—it was about a corporate culture that treated workers as expendable in service of delivery schedules and profit margins, with consequences that could be measured in body counts.

The tragedy also revealed the limitations of workers’ ability to protect themselves within Amazon’s system. Workers who had violated the cellphone ban to maintain emergency communication were vindicated in the aftermath, but it shouldn’t have required workers violating company policy to access basic safety information during severe weather. The fact that Amazon’s safety systems relied on management decision-making—with workers unable to independently assess risk or evacuate when they judged conditions dangerous—created fatal vulnerabilities that the Edwardsville tornado exposed with terrible clarity.