Biden Nominates Frank Kendall for Air Force Secretary After $702,000 in Northrop Grumman Consulting Fees

President Joe Biden nominated Frank Kendall for Air Force Secretary in May 2021 despite Kendall having received $702,319 in consulting fees from Northrop Grumman as part of a $300,000 per year consulting contract after serving as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics under President Obama. The nomination exemplified the Biden administration’s embrace of the Pentagon revolving door, placing a recent Northrop Grumman consultant in charge of the Air Force at the exact moment the service was overseeing Northrop’s $80 billion B-21 Raider bomber program, multibillion-dollar ICBM contracts, and numerous other major weapons systems that would generate enormous revenue for Kendall’s recent employer.

Kendall served as the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer from 2012 to 2017, holding the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics—the official responsible for overseeing all major defense acquisition programs across the military services. In that role, Kendall had authority over contract awards, acquisition policy, and program oversight affecting hundreds of billions in defense spending annually, including numerous contracts that went to Northrop Grumman for programs including the B-21 bomber competition, Global Hawk drones, and various missile defense systems. After leaving the Pentagon in 2017, Kendall immediately began consulting for defense contractors including Northrop Grumman, collecting $702,319 from the company over several years before his Air Force Secretary nomination.

The consulting arrangement creates obvious conflicts where Kendall’s decisions as Pentagon acquisition chief may have been influenced by the prospect of lucrative post-government employment, and his decisions as Air Force Secretary could be shaped by relationships and obligations to his recent consulting client. Northrop Grumman’s $300,000 annual consulting fee vastly exceeded Kendall’s government salary, providing powerful financial incentives that could have influenced his judgment while serving as acquisition chief. The company’s willingness to pay such substantial fees to a recently departed Pentagon official suggests they valued his insider knowledge, relationships with current officials, and potential future influence if he returned to government service—as indeed occurred with his Air Force Secretary nomination.

As Air Force Secretary, Kendall holds authority over the same programs and contracts that benefited Northrop Grumman during his tenure as acquisition chief and consulting period, creating circular conflicts where he oversees the outcomes of decisions he influenced in prior roles. The Air Force Secretary directs service acquisition strategy, sets budget priorities, advocates for specific programs in Congressional testimony, and makes final decisions on contract awards and program continuation—all decisions that directly impact Northrop Grumman’s revenue from major programs including the B-21 bomber, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent ICBM, and various space and missile defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars.

The Kendall nomination demonstrates how the revolving door operates as a systematic corruption mechanism where defense contractors reward former Pentagon officials with lucrative consulting contracts, then benefit when those same officials return to government positions with authority over contractor profits. This creates a permanent cycle where current Pentagon officials know that protecting contractor interests will be rewarded with consulting fees after government service, while former officials returning to government bring contractor perspectives and relationships that shape decisions in industry’s favor. The Senate’s confirmation of Kendall despite these obvious conflicts shows how both parties have normalized the revolving door as an accepted feature of defense policy rather than the corruption and institutional capture it represents.