DOJ Sues Google for Search Monopoly Through Exclusionary Contracts

On October 20, 2020, the United States Department of Justice, joined by eleven state Attorneys General, filed a landmark antitrust lawsuit against Google LLC for illegally monopolizing search and search advertising markets. The case represented the federal government’s most significant antitrust enforcement action since United States v. Microsoft Corporation two decades earlier.

The Core Allegations

The DOJ complaint alleged that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act through a pattern of exclusionary conduct that maintained its monopolies in:

1. General search services (approximately 90% market share in the US)
2. General search text advertising (approximately 95% market share)

Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen stated: “If the government does not enforce the antitrust laws to enable competition, we could lose the next wave of innovation. If that happens, Americans may never get to see the next Google.”

Exclusionary Contracts: The Apple Deal

The centerpiece of the DOJ’s case involved Google’s agreements with Apple, Samsung, and other device manufacturers and browser developers to make Google the default search engine. The complaint characterized these as “exclusionary agreements” that foreclosed competitors from reaching users.

The Financial Scale

While initially reported that Google paid approximately $12 billion annually for default search placement, trial testimony in 2023 revealed the staggering actual amounts:

• 2021: Google paid $26.3 billion total for default search placement
• 2021: Apple alone received $18 billion from Google
• 2022: Payments to Apple increased further

These payments represented 15-20% of Apple’s annual profits—making Google’s search monopoly financially essential to Apple’s business model. The arrangement created perverse incentives where Apple benefited from Google’s monopoly and had no incentive to develop competing search technology or support rivals.

Market Foreclosure

The DOJ argued these contracts foreclosed competition because:

1. Default effect: 50% of search queries on mobile devices go to the pre-loaded default search engine. Users rarely change defaults, meaning default placement determines market outcomes rather than product quality.

2. Scale barriers: Search engines require massive query volume to improve through machine learning. By controlling default placement on 60% of American mobile devices (through Apple) plus Android’s 95% market share, Google prevented rivals from achieving necessary scale.

3. Data monopoly: Default placement gave Google access to billions of daily search queries, allowing continuous algorithm improvement while rivals received insufficient data to compete effectively.

4. Revenue share arrangements: Google’s payments to Apple and others were structured as percentage of search advertising revenue, aligning partners’ incentives with Google’s monopoly maintenance rather than competition.

Mobile Search Dominance

On mobile devices, Google controlled approximately 95% of search queries through combination of:

• Android: Google’s own operating system (covered in separate Android antitrust case) with Google Search pre-installed
• iOS: Default search agreement with Apple worth billions annually
• Mobile browsers: Default search deals with Safari, Firefox, and others

The complaint documented that mobile search had become the primary way Americans accessed the internet, making control of mobile search distribution essential to maintaining overall search monopoly.

General Search Agreements (GSAs)

Beyond the high-profile Apple deal, Google maintained an intricate network of “General Search Agreements” with device manufacturers, wireless carriers, and browser developers including:

• Samsung and other Android manufacturers
• **LG, Motorola, and smaller device makers
• AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile (wireless carriers)
• Mozilla (Firefox browser)

These agreements typically included:

• Substantial revenue sharing from search advertising
• Requirements to pre-install Google Search
• Prohibition on pre-installing competing search engines
• Placement requirements (Google must be default or only search option)

The Self-Reinforcing Monopoly Cycle

The DOJ’s complaint described how Google’s monopoly was self-reinforcing:

1. Exclusionary contracts → control of user access points (defaults)
2. User query volume → data for algorithm improvement
3. Algorithm quality → better search results and more advertising revenue
4. Advertising revenue → resources to pay for more exclusionary contracts
5. Cycle repeats → monopoly strengthens over time

This created “barriers to entry that are insurmountable” for would-be competitors. Even Microsoft, with vast resources and Bing search engine, could not overcome these barriers after years of trying and billions invested.

Historical Context: The Microsoft Comparison

The case deliberately invoked comparison to United States v. Microsoft:

• Microsoft (1998): Used Windows OS dominance to foreclose Netscape browser
• Google (2020): Used search dominance + exclusionary contracts to foreclose search competitors

Assistant Deputy Attorney General Ryan Shores stated: “Two decades ago, the Department’s antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft helped pave the way for the innovation that followed, including the birth of Google itself. This lawsuit is similarly aimed at ensuring the next generation of innovators will succeed as well.”

State Participation

The case was joined by Attorneys General from eleven states:

• Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Carolina, and Texas

Additional states filed separate antitrust suits against Google in December 2020 focused on advertising technology monopolization.

Google’s Defense

Google defended its practices through several arguments:

• Product quality: Google’s search dominance resulted from superior product, not anticompetitive contracts
• Consumer choice: Users could easily change default search engines if they preferred alternatives
• Pro-competitive payments: Payments to Apple and others represented revenue sharing from a superior service
• Competition exists: Users could access Bing, DuckDuckGo, and other search alternatives
• Innovation benefits: Google’s scale allowed investment in search quality improvements that benefited consumers

Kent Walker, Google’s Chief Legal Officer, stated: “This lawsuit would do nothing to help consumers. To the contrary, it would artificially prop up lower-quality search alternatives, raise phone prices, and make it harder for people to get the search services they want to use.”

Trial and Ruling

The trial began on September 12, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia before Judge Amit Mehta. Key evidence included:

Internal Google documents showing:

• Company’s awareness that default placements were essential to maintaining monopoly
• Strategic decisions to pay “whatever it takes” to maintain Apple agreement
• Analysis showing defaults determine market outcomes regardless of product quality

Testimony from:

• Google executives including Sundar Pichai
• Apple executives explaining the financial importance of Google payments
• Competitors describing inability to compete without default placement
• Economists analyzing barriers to entry and anticompetitive effects

On August 5, 2024, Judge Mehta issued his ruling, finding that Google acted illegally to maintain monopolies in:

1. General search services
2. General search text advertising

The ruling stated that Google’s exclusive distribution agreements with Apple and Android manufacturers were anticompetitive and that Google was a monopolist that had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Significance for Tech Antitrust

The Google search case represented a watershed moment for tech antitrust enforcement:

Precedent for platform accountability: First successful Section 2 challenge to a major tech platform’s core business model since Microsoft

Default placement power: Established that control of defaults on devices and browsers could constitute illegal monopoly maintenance

Data as barrier to entry: Recognized that monopolistic data collection creates insurmountable competitive barriers

Payments as exclusion: Documented how revenue sharing agreements can foreclose competition even without explicit exclusivity requirements

Mobile platform control: Showed how operating system control (Android) plus financial agreements (Apple) could lock up entire mobile search market

Potential Remedies

Following the August 2024 liability ruling, remedies phase was scheduled to determine appropriate relief. Potential remedies discussed include:

Behavioral remedies:

• Prohibition on exclusionary default search agreements
• Requirements for choice screens on devices and browsers
• Restrictions on revenue sharing arrangements that foreclose competition

Structural remedies:

• Potential divestiture of Android operating system
• Separation of search advertising business from search services
• Breaking up integrated platforms to reduce monopoly leverage

The remedies phase will determine whether the solution focuses on behavior modification or structural changes to reduce Google’s market power.

Broader Implications

The Google search monopoly case influenced:

• Emboldened state and federal antitrust enforcement against Big Tech
• Bipartisan support for stronger antitrust laws and enforcement
• EU Digital Markets Act targeting “gatekeeper” platforms
• Congressional investigations into tech platform market power
• Recognition that digital markets require active antitrust enforcement

The case demonstrated that the Justice Department was willing and able to challenge the market power of the world’s most valuable companies—signaling the end of decades of permissive antitrust policy toward tech platforms.