House Committee Report Documents Boeing-FAA Regulatory Capture That Killed 346 People

The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure released its final 238-page report on the Boeing 737 MAX disasters, concluding that the crashes “were the horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA—the pernicious result of regulatory capture on the part of the FAA with respect to its responsibilities to perform robust oversight of Boeing and to ensure the safety of the flying public.”

The 18-month investigation, led by Chair Peter DeFazio (D-OR) and Aviation Subcommittee Chair Rick Larsen (D-WA), reviewed an estimated 600,000 pages of documents, held five public hearings with more than 20 witnesses, and interviewed dozens of whistleblowers and current and former Boeing and FAA employees. The investigation documented systematic regulatory capture where the FAA had effectively surrendered its safety oversight function to Boeing through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program.

The report revealed Boeing’s culture of concealment: the company withheld crucial safety data from the FAA, including internal test results showing it took Boeing test pilots more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a simulator, a condition the pilot described as “catastrophic.” Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond within four seconds. Boeing concealed MCAS entirely from pilots’ manuals and training materials to avoid triggering costly simulator training requirements, which would have reduced aircraft sales.

The investigation found the FAA’s oversight structure created inherent conflicts of interest, with Boeing employees authorized to perform work “on behalf of the FAA” repeatedly failing to alert the agency to safety and certification issues. The FAA had delegated so much authority to Boeing that the manufacturer was essentially self-certifying its own aircraft while facing competitive pressure from Airbus and internal pressure to maximize shareholder returns.

The report documented that Boeing executives prioritized production speed and cost reduction over safety, rushing the 737 MAX to market to compete with the Airbus A320neo. This commercial pressure, combined with regulatory capture, created the conditions for 346 preventable deaths. The House investigation provided definitive evidence that the crashes resulted not from isolated mistakes but from systematic institutional corruption where regulatory agencies serve corporate profits rather than public safety.