Trump Administration Approves Unprecedented Raytheon Technology Transfer to Let Saudis Build Bombs Domestically

On June 7, 2019, reports revealed that the Trump administration’s $8.1 billion emergency arms sale to Saudi Arabia included an unprecedented provision allowing Raytheon to transfer sensitive precision-guided munitions technology to Saudi Arabia for domestic bomb production. The deal authorized Raytheon to “team up” with Saudi partners to manufacture control systems, guidance electronics, and circuit cards essential to Paveway smart bombs inside the kingdom—technology the United States had closely guarded for national security reasons. The technology transfer would enable Saudi Arabia to develop indigenous capabilities to produce the same precision-guided weapons documented killing thousands of Yemeni civilians, ensuring the bombing campaign could continue even if future US administrations attempted to restrict weapons sales. Arms control expert William Hartung warned that “if Saudi Arabia is able to develop an indigenous bomb-making capability as a result of this deal, it will undermine US leverage to prevent them from engaging in indiscriminate strikes of the kind it has carried out in Yemen.”

Raytheon Paveway Production Technology

The technology transfer encompassed the most sensitive components of Raytheon’s Paveway precision-guided munition system: guidance electronics, control systems, and circuit cards that convert unguided bombs into laser-guided weapons. These technologies represented decades of US military research and development, closely guarded for both national security and commercial reasons. By authorizing Raytheon to share these capabilities with Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration crossed a threshold from weapons sales to enabling foreign indigenous production of advanced military systems. The deal would allow Saudi Arabia to manufacture Paveway components domestically, reducing dependence on US approvals for munitions transfers and creating a permanent capability to produce precision-guided weapons. For Raytheon, the technology transfer represented both immediate contract revenue from the co-production arrangement and long-term strategic positioning in the Saudi market through technology partnership and manufacturing infrastructure.

Undermining Future Arms Sale Restrictions

Congressional critics and arms control experts warned that enabling Saudi domestic bomb production would eliminate future US leverage to constrain Saudi military operations through weapons restrictions. If Saudi Arabia could manufacture its own Paveway-type munitions, US decisions to pause or block arms sales would have minimal impact on the kingdom’s military capabilities. Senator Chris Murphy stated that the technology transfer “will not only enable more indiscriminate killing, it will also remove the limited accountability currently provided by the potential of a pause in the flow of bombs.” The provision essentially surrendered one of the few policy tools available to constrain Saudi behavior—the threat of withholding precision-guided munitions. Once Saudi Arabia developed indigenous production capabilities, congressional debates over arms sale restrictions would become largely symbolic, as the kingdom could continue manufacturing the weapons domestically regardless of US policy. The technology transfer represented a permanent commitment to Saudi military capabilities that could not be easily reversed by future administrations concerned about Yemen atrocities.

Part of Emergency Declaration Package

The Raytheon technology transfer was embedded in the $8.1 billion emergency arms sale package that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo approved on May 24, 2019 using a rarely-invoked authority to bypass congressional review. The emergency declaration cited Iranian threats as justification for immediate weapons transfers, though critics noted the technology transfer provision had nothing to do with emergency response and represented long-term industrial planning. The inclusion of sensitive technology transfers in an “emergency” sale suggested the Trump administration used the emergency authority to push through controversial provisions that could not survive normal congressional scrutiny. Congressional committees reviewing the deal expressed particular concern about the Raytheon technology transfer, but the emergency declaration prevented them from blocking it through standard procedures. The provision demonstrated how the fake emergency served Raytheon’s commercial interests by packaging long-sought technology partnership agreements with security justifications that shielded them from democratic oversight.

Significance

The June 7, 2019 revelation that Trump approved Raytheon technology transfer enabling Saudi domestic bomb production represented the most significant long-term escalation of US complicity in Yemen atrocities, moving beyond temporary weapons sales to creating permanent Saudi capabilities to manufacture the precision-guided munitions documented killing thousands of civilians. The technology transfer crossed a threshold from arming an ally to enabling indigenous weapons production that would continue regardless of future US policy changes or human rights concerns. For Raytheon, the deal represented extraordinary returns: the company would profit from technology licensing fees, co-production arrangements, training contracts, and long-term maintenance relationships while positioning itself as essential partner in Saudi military industrialization. Arms expert William Hartung’s warning that the transfer would “undermine US leverage” proved prescient—by enabling Saudi domestic production, the Trump administration surrendered one of the few policy tools available to constrain Saudi conduct through weapons restrictions. Future congressional efforts to block Raytheon Paveway sales would become largely symbolic once Saudi Arabia could manufacture equivalent systems domestically. The technology transfer revealed the Trump administration’s complete capture by defense contractor interests: Raytheon sought technology partnership agreements to deepen its Saudi relationships, and the administration packaged these commercial arrangements as emergency national security necessities requiring circumvention of congressional oversight. The deal’s inclusion in the fake Iran “emergency” declaration demonstrated how security justifications served as cover for advancing contractor commercial interests that could not survive transparent democratic review. For Yemen civilians, the technology transfer ensured that bombing campaigns using precision-guided munitions would continue indefinitely regardless of future US policy shifts, as Saudi Arabia would possess indigenous capabilities to produce the weapons killing them. The provision exemplified how defense contractor influence extended beyond individual arms sales to fundamentally reshape allied military capabilities in ways that served corporate profits while undermining human rights and democratic accountability.