Wells Fargo Revises Fake Account Count to 3.5 Million, Up 67%

Wells Fargo announces that its fake accounts scandal affected approximately 3.5 million accounts—a 67% increase from the initial estimate of 2.1 million accounts disclosed during the 2016 settlement. The revised analysis covers January 2009 to September 2016, nearly twice the timeframe of the original review, revealing that the fraud was far more extensive and long-running than initially acknowledged. The admission demonstrates that even Wells Fargo’s own internal investigations systematically minimized the scope of wrongdoing.

Expanding Timeline, Expanding Fraud

The original CFPB settlement in September 2016 covered accounts created between 2011 and 2016. The new independent review extends back to 2009 and adds 1.4 million potentially unauthorized accounts to the count. The fraud now encompasses nearly eight years of systematic misconduct, affecting 3.5 million customer accounts through unauthorized deposit accounts, credit cards, online banking enrollments, and bill pay services. The expansion reveals that the 2016 settlement addressed only a fraction of the actual fraud.

Systematic Undercount

The dramatic upward revision raises critical questions about Wells Fargo’s initial disclosures. Did the bank’s original internal review deliberately limit its scope to minimize the apparent scale of fraud? Was the 2011-2016 timeframe chosen to exclude earlier misconduct that leadership knew existed? The addition of 1.4 million accounts suggests the initial count was not an honest mistake but a strategic minimization. Wells Fargo’s new CEO Timothy Sloan frames the revision as transparency, but it could equally be seen as forced honesty after the original confession proved inadequate.

Still Likely Incomplete

Even the 3.5 million figure may undercount the full scope. The review relies on Wells Fargo’s own records and algorithms to identify potentially unauthorized accounts. Customers who never discovered fake accounts opened in their names, accounts that were opened and closed quickly, or fraud that fell outside the review’s parameters would not appear in the count. Independent estimates suggest the true number could be higher still.

Significance

The 67% upward revision reveals a pattern that will become familiar in the Wells Fargo scandal: initial minimization, forced disclosure, eventual admission of greater wrongdoing. The bank’s acknowledgment that 3.5 million accounts were potentially fraudulent—75% more than initially claimed—undermines any remaining credibility in Wells Fargo’s self-reporting. It demonstrates that even after being caught and fined, the bank continued to downplay the scope of fraud until additional scrutiny forced fuller disclosure. The revision also exposes the inadequacy of the 2016 settlement: a $185 million fine based on 2 million fake accounts becomes absurdly small when the true count is 3.5 million. Yet there will be no proportional increase in penalties, no new criminal referrals, and no accountability for the minimization itself. The episode confirms that Wells Fargo’s strategy of gradual disclosure, minimal accountability, and no criminal consequences for executives will succeed.