Boeing Delivers First 737 MAX Despite Internal Safety Concerns About MCAS

Boeing delivered its first 737 MAX 8 aircraft to Malaysian carrier Malindo Air on May 16, 2017, entering revenue service on May 22. The delivery occurred despite internal Boeing communications showing employees knew the aircraft had serious safety problems, including design flaws in the MCAS system that would kill 189 people on a Malindo Air flight just 18 months later. In an April 2017 internal message, just weeks before the first delivery, a Boeing employee wrote: “This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys.”

Boeing had rushed the MAX to market to compete with the Airbus A320neo, compressing development timelines and cutting corners on safety testing and pilot training requirements. The company concealed the MCAS system from pilots’ manuals and training materials, knowing that revealing its existence would trigger FAA requirements for costly simulator training that would reduce MAX sales. Boeing test pilots had discovered that recovering from uncommanded MCAS activation took more than 10 seconds in simulators—far longer than the 4-second response time assumed in certification standards—but this data was withheld from the FAA.

Southwest Airlines, the launch customer for the MAX, had contractually required Boeing to reduce each aircraft’s price by $1 million if the FAA required simulator training. This financial incentive drove Boeing to minimize training requirements at all costs. Internal emails showed Boeing employees discussing how to “Jedi-mind trick” the FAA into accepting minimal training, and Southwest managers even proposed schemes to deceive regulators about whether the MAX required new training.

The first delivery represented the culmination of systematic fraud in the certification process. Boeing had obtained FAA approval through the Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program, which allowed Boeing employees to certify their own aircraft “on behalf of” the FAA. These Boeing-employed designees approved MCAS despite its reliance on a single sensor with no redundancy, its ability to activate repeatedly without pilot knowledge, and its authority to override pilot inputs—all design choices that violated basic aviation safety principles.

By delivering the MAX to revenue service while knowing about fundamental safety flaws, Boeing and its executives committed fraud on a massive scale. The aircraft entered commercial operation carrying paying passengers despite internal warnings that it was unsafe. Eighteen months later, 189 people would die on a Malindo Air/Lion Air 737 MAX when MCAS activated due to a faulty sensor, exactly as Boeing’s own engineers had feared. The first delivery marked the moment when Boeing’s corporate decisions crossed from reckless into criminal, knowingly endangering thousands of lives for market share and profit.