Boeing Rushes 737 MAX Development to Beat Airbus, Cutting Development Time in Half

Boeing accelerated 737 MAX development to a “frenetic” pace during 2015, attempting to deliver the aircraft in approximately four years instead of the decade typically required for new aircraft development. The rushed timeline came as Boeing fell nine months behind Airbus’s competing A320neo, which was already accumulating orders. Current and former Boeing employees described the work environment as “go, go, go,” with designers and engineers pushed to deliver in about half the normal timeframe for a project of this scale.

The compressed development schedule forced Boeing to take dangerous shortcuts in design, testing, and safety analysis. Rather than properly engineering solutions to the aerodynamic challenges created by the MAX’s larger, repositioned engines, Boeing chose to develop the automated MCAS system as a quick fix. The system was designed late in the development process to counteract the aircraft’s tendency to pitch up, allowing Boeing to avoid the costly and time-consuming redesign that proper engineering would have required.

As Boeing hustled to catch up to Airbus and certify the MAX, FAA managers pushed the agency’s safety engineers to delegate safety assessments to Boeing itself and to speedily approve the resulting analysis. This pressure came directly from the top of the FAA, where acting administrators with industry backgrounds prioritized maintaining Boeing’s competitive position over rigorous safety oversight. FAA safety engineers who raised concerns about the rushed certification process were overruled by management.

The rushed development created a culture where meeting deadlines mattered more than addressing safety issues. Engineers who identified problems faced pressure to find workarounds rather than fundamental solutions. Testing was compressed, safety analyses were inadequate, and critical design decisions were made based on schedule rather than engineering soundness. Boeing’s internal communications from this period, later released during investigations, showed employees joking about “Jedi-mind tricking” regulators and deceiving the FAA about training requirements.

The decision to compress development time by half represented a calculated corporate gamble with passenger lives. Boeing executives knew that a normally-paced development cycle would allow Airbus to capture narrowbody market share for years before the MAX entered service. They chose to rush an inadequately designed aircraft to market rather than concede competitive position. The 346 people who died in MAX crashes paid the price for Boeing’s schedule pressure and the FAA’s complicity in rubber-stamping an aircraft that needed years more development.