KBR's Faulty Electrical Work Kills Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth, Part of Systematic Negligence Causing 18 Electrocution Deaths in Iraq with No Criminal Charges Despite Army Negligent Homicide Finding

Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth, a 24-year-old Green Beret from Pittsburgh, was electrocuted in a shower at Radwaniyah Palace Complex near Baghdad on January 2, 2008, when an improperly grounded water pump installed by KBR short-circuited and sent electrical current through the shower water. Pentagon Inspector General investigations revealed that KBR had inspected the building and discovered serious electrical problems 11 months before Maseth’s death but failed to correct them, directly causing his electrocution. Army Criminal Investigations reclassified Maseth’s death as “negligent homicide” caused by KBR and two of its supervisors, finding that “KBR failed to ensure work was done by qualified electricians and plumbers.” Despite this criminal classification, the Pentagon announced no criminal charges would be filed, demonstrating systematic contractor impunity where corporations could kill American soldiers through gross negligence without facing criminal prosecution.

Maseth’s death was not an isolated incident but part of systematic KBR negligence that killed at least 18 soldiers and contractors from electrocution in Iraq, including Navy Petty Officer Third Class David Cedergren, Army Cpl. Marcos Nolasco, contractor Adam Hermanson, and Staff Sgt. Christopher Lee Everett (electrocuted in September 2005 while using a power washer). Pentagon investigations documented that 9 of the 18 electrocution deaths were caused by “improper grounding or faulty equipment” installed by KBR. The Defense Department’s Task Force SAFE inspected 20,340 facilities maintained by KBR and found that 6,935 facilities—34% of those inspected—failed initial electrical safety inspections. KBR’s own database documented 231 electric shock incidents across the 89,000+ facilities the company operated in Iraq, with 94 troops seeking medical treatment for electric shock in a single year. The systematic nature of these failures revealed cost-cutting prioritization over soldier safety, with KBR using unqualified personnel for critical electrical work while billing the government for qualified electrician rates.

The Pentagon’s response to systematic contractor negligence causing soldier deaths demonstrated complete capture of accountability mechanisms. Rather than prosecuting KBR or its supervisors for negligent homicide, the Defense Department paid KBR more than $80 million in bonuses for electrical installation contracts—the same contracts that produced faulty work killing American soldiers. Over $30 million in bonuses were awarded to KBR after Maseth’s death, rewarding the company for work that Army Criminal Investigations had classified as criminal negligence. When questioned about systematic electrical failures, a KBR spokeswoman categorically denied responsibility, stating “KBR is not responsible for the electrocution deaths widely reported, including that of Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth,” despite Pentagon findings directly contradicting this claim. The company faced no contract termination, no debarment from future federal contracting, and no reduction in the billions it received in Iraq War contracts.

The electrocution deaths exposed how privatization of military functions eliminated accountability that would automatically apply to government personnel or uniformed military. If military electricians had installed faulty wiring that killed 18 soldiers, they would face courts-martial, military prison, and dishonorable discharge. If government civilian employees had caused these deaths through negligent work, they would face federal prosecution under existing statutes. But KBR’s status as a private contractor created a legal shield where Army investigations could classify deaths as “negligent homicide” while the Justice Department declined to prosecute, the Defense Department continued awarding bonuses, and the company maintained its position as one of the Pentagon’s largest contractors. The systematic impunity demonstrated that contractor status functioned as immunity from criminal accountability for causing American soldier deaths.

The Pentagon’s continuation of bonus payments to KBR after documented negligent homicides revealed systematic prioritization of contractor relationships over soldier safety and legal accountability. The Defense Contract Management Agency—the government body responsible for contractor oversight—accepted KBR’s “corrective action plans” while soldiers continued being electrocuted in KBR facilities. The re-inspection findings showed that when KBR facilities with faulty electrical work were inspected a second time, they passed, suggesting the company had the capability to do safe work but chose not to until forced by inspections. This pattern demonstrated that KBR’s systematic negligence was not incompetence but a business decision: it was more profitable to install faulty electrical work quickly and cheaply, accept occasional soldier deaths, and rely on contractor impunity to avoid criminal prosecution or contract termination, than to properly train personnel and install safe electrical systems that would reduce profit margins on cost-plus contracts.

The Maseth case and broader electrocution scandal established a precedent that contractor negligence causing soldier deaths would face no meaningful consequences. No KBR executives were prosecuted, no contracts were terminated, bonuses continued flowing, and the company maintained its multi-billion dollar Iraq operations while denying responsibility for deaths that Pentagon investigators had classified as negligent homicide. The systematic impunity demonstrated that privatized military functions created accountability-free zones where contractors could profit from soldier deaths without facing the criminal prosecution, professional consequences, or public accountability that would automatically apply to government personnel performing identical functions.