FBI Inspector General Reports 35% Error Rate on Terror Watchlist

A Department of Justice Inspector General audit revealed that the FBI’s terrorist watchlist contained approximately 35% errors, with large portions of the list governed by no formal processes for updating or removing records. The report exposed systematic failures in a watchlist system that had grown to include hundreds of thousands of names, with devastating consequences for innocent people wrongly flagged as terrorism suspects.

Inspector General Findings

The September 2007 audit by the DOJ Inspector General examined the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which serves as the government’s master watchlist and feeds into various screening systems including the No Fly List, Selectee List, and other security databases. The audit found:

Error Rate:

• Approximately 35% of records examined contained errors
• Errors included outdated information, incorrect identifications, and unjustified inclusions
• Many records lacked adequate documentation supporting watchlist placement
• Nominations to the watchlist often failed to meet the government’s own standards

Process Failures:

• Large portions of the watchlist were governed by no formal processes for reviewing or removing records
• No systematic mechanism existed for correcting errors once identified
• Individuals wrongly placed on watchlists faced nearly insurmountable obstacles to clearing their names
• The “redress” process was essentially non-functional

Scale of the Problem

By 2007, the FBI’s master terrorist watchlist already included hundreds of thousands of names. According to the most recent information available at the time, the Terrorist Screening Database contained well over one million names. The rapid expansion of the watchlist, combined with the 35% error rate, meant that hundreds of thousands of people were potentially wrongly flagged as terrorism suspects.

The watchlist grew exponentially after 9/11, from tens of thousands of names to over a million, with minimal oversight or quality control. Government officials added names based on vague and overbroad criteria, often with evidence that was stale, poorly reviewed, or of questionable reliability.

Impact on Innocent People

The consequences of wrongly being placed on a watchlist were severe and life-altering:

Travel Restrictions:

• Individuals on the No Fly List were barred from commercial air travel
• Those on the Selectee List faced enhanced screening, delays, and harassment at airports
• Many people discovered their watchlist status only when attempting to board planes
• Some U.S. citizens found themselves unable to return home from abroad

Employment and Economic Harm:

• Watchlist status affected ability to obtain or maintain employment, particularly in aviation or security-sensitive fields
• Professional licenses and security clearances were denied or revoked
• Financial accounts were sometimes frozen or restricted
• Background checks revealed watchlist status, damaging reputations

Stigmatization:

• Being labeled a terrorism suspect carried severe social stigma
• Individuals faced suspicion from neighbors, employers, and communities
• Families of watchlisted individuals also experienced harassment and surveillance

Due Process Failures

The Inspector General report highlighted fundamental due process violations:

Lack of Notice:

• The government’s official policy was to refuse to confirm or deny watchlist status
• People could not challenge their inclusion if they didn’t officially know they were listed
• Many discovered their status only through repeated travel problems or employment denials

Inadequate Redress:

• The Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) provided no meaningful way to challenge watchlist placement
• Individuals received form letters neither confirming nor denying their status or explaining the basis for travel problems
• No mechanism existed to confront evidence or challenge the accuracy of information
• The redress process typically took years with no guaranteed resolution

Secret Standards:

• Criteria for watchlist inclusion were classified and vague
• Individuals could not know what conduct supposedly justified their inclusion
• Government agencies used different and sometimes contradictory standards
• No public accountability for watchlist decisions

Subsequent Legal Challenges

The Inspector General’s findings supported ongoing legal challenges to the watchlist system:

ACLU Litigation (2010-2014):

• The ACLU filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of innocent travelers wrongly placed on the No Fly List
• In 2014, a federal judge ruled that the government’s redress process “falls far short of satisfying the requirements of due process” and is “wholly ineffective”
• The court found the process violated constitutional rights by failing to provide notice or meaningful opportunity to challenge placement

Continued Problems:

• Despite the Inspector General findings and court rulings, fundamental problems persisted
• The watchlist continued to grow, reaching over 1.5 million names by 2017
• Error rates remained high, with no comprehensive review of existing records
• The redress system remained inadequate even after court-ordered reforms

Broader Context: Informant Recruitment

Civil liberties advocates documented that the FBI was using watchlist placement as leverage to recruit informants:

• FBI agents approached individuals on watchlists and offered to remove them in exchange for serving as informants
• The No Fly List became a tool for pressuring Muslims to spy on their communities
• ACLU documented numerous cases where watchlist placement appeared designed to coerce cooperation rather than address genuine security concerns

Significance

The Inspector General’s findings revealed that the FBI had created a massive watchlist system with minimal accuracy, no meaningful oversight, and devastating consequences for innocent people. A 35% error rate in a system affecting hundreds of thousands of people meant that law-abiding citizens—including U.S. citizens and legal residents—were being wrongly branded as terrorism suspects with virtually no recourse.

The watchlist system exemplified the post-9/11 expansion of surveillance and security measures without adequate safeguards for civil liberties or due process. By refusing to even confirm or deny watchlist status while simultaneously imposing severe restrictions on travel, employment, and reputation, the government created a Kafka-esque system where people could be punished as suspected terrorists without being told why, without seeing evidence against them, and without any effective way to clear their names.

The high error rate and lack of accountability demonstrated how security bureaucracies, operating in secrecy and insulated from judicial review, inevitably produced systems that sacrificed accuracy and fairness in favor of expansive inclusion—better to list innocent people than risk excluding a genuine threat, regardless of the constitutional rights violated in the process.