Northrop Grumman B-2 Bomber Program Reaches $44 Billion Total Cost

The U.S. Air Force’s B-2 Spirit stealth bomber program, built by Northrop Grumman, reached a staggering total program cost of $44.389 billion in then-year dollars by 1997, according to Government Accountability Office reports. This represented a dramatic escalation from original estimates and made the B-2 the most expensive aircraft program in history, with a per-unit cost of approximately $2.13 billion when development, procurement, and support costs were averaged across the final fleet of 21 aircraft.

The program’s costs spiraled as the planned fleet size was repeatedly slashed from an original 132 aircraft to just 21 operational bombers. In 1981, the Air Force initially planned to acquire 132 B-2s, but budgetary pressures and Congressional opposition led Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to cut the order to 75 in 1990. President George H.W. Bush announced in his 1992 State of the Union address that production would be limited to 20 aircraft, with a 21st prototype later converted to operational status at a cost of nearly $500 million. Representatives Ron Dellums and John Kasich led Congressional efforts from 1989 through the early 1990s to limit production, ultimately succeeding in capping the fleet at 21 bombers.

The dramatic fleet reduction had a devastating impact on per-unit costs. When the order was cut from 132 to 75 aircraft, total program costs dropped from $75.4 billion to $61.1 billion, but per-aircraft costs paradoxically increased from $571 million to $815 million. By the time the fleet was limited to 21 aircraft, the all-inclusive per-unit cost had ballooned to $2.13 billion per bomber. The GAO reported that Northrop Grumman delivered the first seven production aircraft with substantial deficiencies, averaging 65 major deviations and waivers each and arriving an average of 57 days behind schedule. The seventh aircraft alone contained 79 deviations, with 34 duplicating problems from the first aircraft, raising serious questions about quality control and contractor performance.

Congress established a strict cost cap of $28.968 billion in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars and required regular reporting on total acquisition costs through program completion. By fiscal year 1995, 91% of the projected costs had been appropriated, leaving approximately $3.988 billion to be funded through 2004. The Air Force’s cost estimate included $1.324 billion for contingencies and reserves, plus $206 million for potential contract cost overruns, suggesting officials anticipated additional financial challenges beyond base program costs. As of May 1995, only 44% of required flight test hours had been completed despite six years of testing, creating further uncertainty about final costs and schedule adherence.

The B-2 bomber program exemplifies the cost-plus contracting model that enables defense contractors like Northrop Grumman to profit from program delays and modifications while taxpayers bear the financial risk. The program’s escalating costs, quality control failures, and schedule delays demonstrate how the military-industrial complex operates with minimal accountability, turning what should have been a $571 million per-aircraft program into a $2.13 billion per-unit boondoggle that consumed over $44 billion in taxpayer funds.