Superfund Law Passes But Industry Successfully Builds In Weaknesses and Delays

On December 11, 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund. While the law represented a landmark response to Love Canal and thousands of toxic waste sites nationwide, industry lobbying had already ensured significant weaknesses that would hamper cleanup efforts for decades.

The Chemical Manufacturers Association and American Petroleum Institute led intensive lobbying during the bill’s development. They succeeded in limiting the taxing mechanism to specific industries rather than creating a broad hazardous waste fee, reducing the initial fund size from $4.2 billion to $1.6 billion, and inserting provisions allowing extended litigation over liability that would delay cleanups for years.

Insurance industry lobbyists successfully excluded coverage disputes from expedited resolution, creating a secondary litigation system that would consume billions in legal fees. The law’s “joint and several liability” provision, while appearing tough on polluters, in practice led to endless finger-pointing among potentially responsible parties.

Most critically, industry groups ensured the law contained no provisions for victim compensation, despite the original intent to help communities like Love Canal. Residents affected by toxic contamination were left to pursue expensive private litigation.

The incoming Reagan administration would further weaken Superfund implementation. Industry groups who lost the legislative battle immediately pivoted to regulatory capture, and within two years EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch would be using Superfund as a slush fund for political favors while slashing enforcement. By 1983, the program was mired in scandal, demonstrating how initial legislative victories can be undermined through administrative sabotage.