Congress Holds 25 Hearings on Pentagon Revolving Door, General Bradley Testifies Against Contractor Influence

Congress holds 25 hearings throughout 1959 to investigate the revolving door between defense contractors and senior military officials, marking the first systematic examination of conflicts of interest in weapons procurement. General Omar Bradley, who served as the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testifies that he does not believe any former government official should “bring any influence” to win contracts for a company. Bradley’s testimony represents the World War II generation’s concerns about the emerging military-industrial complex, contrasting the values of leaders like “Admiral Spruance, Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, General Eisenhower, and a host of other characters whom we all know from World War II, who weren’t so motivated” by post-service industry employment incentives with the newer pattern of officers cultivating contractor relationships during active duty.

The congressional investigation documents how the military-industrial complex “really took off in the 1950s as the United States sought new weapons and technologies for its growing military, which gave Hughes and other military contractors a market to sell everything from helicopters to satellites.” The hearings reveal a systematic “revolving door” that allows military officers to join companies they had just awarded defense contracts to, while private executives work for the Pentagon and funnel contracts back to their companies. This pattern creates pervasive conflicts of interest as officers make procurement decisions with awareness of potential post-retirement employment. The investigation occurs two years before President Eisenhower’s farewell address warns that the military-industrial complex’s influence could “endanger our liberties or democratic processes.”

Despite extensive testimony and documentation of the revolving door problem, Congress fails to enact meaningful restrictions on post-government employment with defense contractors. The hearings establish the pattern of periodic investigations that document conflicts of interest without producing structural reforms. Over subsequent decades, the revolving door accelerates rather than diminishes, with hundreds of senior officials cycling between Pentagon and contractor positions. The 1959 hearings demonstrate that the problem is recognized and investigated within 15 years of the National Security Act, but political will to restrict the practice proves insufficient against the entrenched interests of both military leadership seeking lucrative second careers and contractors seeking insider access to procurement decisions. The investigation’s failure to produce reforms establishes precedent that revolving door conflicts of interest, though acknowledged as problematic, will be tolerated as inherent features of the defense establishment rather than corrected through legislation.